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ABSTRACT: The increasing quantity of items bough and sold over the internet led 
to the success of internet auctions, to the introduction of new auction rules and the 
creation of new businesses and merger among existing ones.  In this paper, we 
present a description of existing internet auction rules and typical profile of 
consumers who use them.  We found that bidders are most likely located in the 
U.S., have some internet experience and skills and that they belong to the 26-50 
years old age group.  We also discuss the implication of online auctions on 
resource allocation. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Auctions have been used to allocate a large amount of resources at least as far back as the 5
th 
century BC in Babylonia (Milgrom and Weber 1982).  Highly structured auctions have evolved 
for livestock and art and have been common for hundreds years.  More recently, auctions are 
being used to sell resources among individuals, businesses and/or organizations and 
governments.  However, it is likely that the total value of all merchandise auctioned over internet 
sites since their advent exceeds the total value of all items auctioned off up to then.  The sheer  
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volume of merchandise auctioned over the internet is staggering and is likely to grow 
substantially.  In this paper, we describe some of the items sold in internet auctions, features of 
these auctions, and the people bidding in those auctions. 
Consumer acceptance has led to both a proliferation of items auctioned off and in online 
auction houses.  Most of the items offered for sale at auctions are common items, e.g., 
electronics, jewelry, collectibles.  However, some items have been unconventional, such as a 
complete Tyrannosaurus Rex skeleton (USA Today, Jan. 17, 2000), fashion models’ ovarian 
eggs where the bids seemed to reach $42,000 per egg (Wilson 1999) and class registration time 
at a university where the bids reached $71 (Myers 1999).
1  EBay is the leading internet auction 
site and is one of the few internet companies that have consistently reported profits.  New 
auction sites have emerged to capture some of the market potential. 
Features of an auction and item being sold depend on the parties buying and selling.  
Internet auctions are categorized as business-to-business (B2B), businesses-to-consumer (B2C) 
and consumer-to-consumer (C2C).
2  B2B can be thought of as a logical extension of either 
electronic data exchange or 'real' auctions in which an auction event attempts to overcome thin 
market problems.  B2C and C2C represent a rather radical departure from traditional consumer 
oriented marketing.  Economies of scale typically lead to marketing to consumers to be done by 
retailers selling larger volumes of standardized products.  In contrast, the advent of internet 
auctions has made transactions for smaller volumes of highly specialized products viable. 
Economic models of auctions justify their use by the existence of asymmetries between 
sellers and potential buyers in the valuation of the item offered for sale.  In many situations, like 
                                                           
1 Before its closure by the seller to avoid possible violation of university rules (http://www.illiniauction.com).  EBay 
recently disallowed a proposed auction in which someone wished to sell his soul on the grounds that, if it did not 
exist, the sale would constitute fraud while, if it did exist, it would be immoral. 
2 This terminology is borrowed from Beam and Segev (1998).  
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in procurement contracts or the sale of any item in general, the most efficient agent or the one 
who places the highest value on the item cannot be singled out.  Auctions allow the seller to 
extract this information from potential buyers.  The economic literature generally finds that the 
choice of the auction procedure used is crucial to payoffs, bidding strategies, and market 
efficiency.  The auction procedure is said to be efficient if it does not allow the existence of a 
second market, which implies that the buyer is indeed the one who values most the item. 
  The classical types of auctions are the first price sealed bid auction, English auction, 
Dutch auction, Japanese Auction and the second price sealed bid auction, named also Vickrey's 
auction, after its designer and is not used very often for reasons explained in Rothkopf, Teisberg 
and Kahn (1990).
3  Many varieties of auctions are being used in different settings, such as the 
share auction (Wilson 1979), the introduction of reserve price, participation fee, and minimum 
bid increment.  A summary of their results and applications are available in Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1980), McAfee and McMillan (1987), and Wilson (1992) to name just as a few. 
  Traditionally auctions are held at market places or in auction houses where bids are made 
in person or submitted via mail and phone.  Since the development of internet use and electronic 
commerce, auctions are being held in the cyberspace that form of auction is referred to by 
internet auction or online auction.  By online auction, we target interactive auction through the 
internet and not the use of the internet just to post an update of bids, the use of e-mail to submit 
bids, the use of the internet to post requests for proposals, or to publicize an auction.  The 
internet offers the advantage of a greater reach hence reducing the problem of lack of bidders and 
rigging that are observed in some traditional auctions.  Internet auctions present many interesting 
features such as the trade of items that were not auctioned off previously, those products range  
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from items the least useful for many, to items that might be shocking or unconventional for 
some, such as Tyrannosaurus Rex skeleton, ovarian eggs, etc…  However, internet auctions do 
not cover only odd and insignificant products because many websites host auctions for art pieces, 
diamonds and automobiles.  Internet auctions brought a new jargon and a new environment for 
all parties in an auction and any attempt to list them all is impossible since features vary across 






  In this paper, we offer a description of internet auction based on what is available in the 
guidelines and rules sections of auction sites (section 2).  Using a dual-scaling technique we 
attempt to set a profile of people who are likely to participate in an internet auction (section 3), 
we found that bidders are most likely located in the U.S., have some internet experience and 
skills and that they belong to the 26-50 age group.  In a following section (section 4), we look 
into the implications of internet auctions on the bidding behavior of buyers, the merger between 
auction houses and auction websites, the economic efficiency, and the dissemination of 
information.  In the conclusion (section 5), we summarize the main findings. 
 
2. DESCRIPTIVE FEATURES OF INTERNET AUCTIONS 
An auction can be described by its three components: the participating parties, the item auctioned 
off, and a specific set of rules that govern interactions between buyers and sellers.  Internet 
auctions do not make exception to that, they rather introduced new elements to each of these 
components; in this section we attempt to define each of the above components. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           




6 http://www.onsale.com  
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2.1. Participating Parties 
Traditionally auctions are held among consumers (C2C) or collectors, among businesses (B2B), 
between businesses and consumers (B2C), between governments and consumers, and between 
governments and businesses.
8  Governments' participation in internet auction is scarce; to our 
best knowledge, the only existing experience is the internet auction conducted by New Zealand's 
Ministry of Commerce to sell radio spectrum in February 1998
9.  C2C internet auctions involve 
end-users amongst themselves and their transactions represent the lion's share of auction postings 
and are present on the majority of internet auction websites.  B2C internet auctions usually 
involve businesses selling services and goods to end-users, and they are the second biggest share 
in internet auctions volume; however, B2C auctions have a higher response rate or realized sales 
(Beam and Segev, 1998) than the C2C auctions, probably because of the credibility and security 
factors.  B2B auctions are still at an embryonic stage, websites offering business opportunities in 




12, this kind of auctions has a strong growth potential. 
  Among the parties in an auction, there is a nonhuman component that acts like the 
auctioneer in traditional auctions; it is the web interface or the website hosting the auction.  In 
same cases, the auction website is disassociated from the ownership of the item being auctioned 
off, as in all C2C and some of B2C or B2B auctions, in other cases the website hosting the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 http://www.haggle.com 
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auction owns the items being auctioned off, for example the US branch of Lufthansa
13 or 
FirstAuction
14 own all the auctioned items. 
  It is important to know that there are no preset rules regarding who sells to whom and 
where.  The choice of website where to post the auction depends on the potential buyers being 
targeted and on the item to sell.  Regarding the individual consumers who are most likely to 
place bids over the internet; an attempt to set a profile for them is in section 3. 
 
2.2 Items Sold in Internet Auctions 
Internet auctions exist for a wide variety of products such as computers and computer related 
products, collectibles of all kinds
15, jewelry, or knowledge
16.  Literally any product, service or 
knowledge is being auctioned off, however by observation the most listed items for sale are 
computers, software and computer peripherals.  We mentioned earlier that the absence of formal 
rules that separate C2C internet auction from B2C or B2B auctions, however from the nature of 
the item one could infer the nature of the parties taking part in the auction.  For instance if the 
item to be sold is a used household item, it is most likely that the targeted audience are final 
consumers.  The seller is a consumer if the item is used and one or few units are to be sold, 
which is the case in many auction website; the seller is a business if the object of the auction is a 
seat on a flight or refurbished equipment.  B2B auctions are easy to spot, if the item to be sold is 
a bundle of products such as spare parts
17 or is a heavy equipment, it is clear that it targets 
businesses.  Some websites make it clear that they are targeting businesses, by asking the name 
of the business among other registration information. 





17 http://www.fastparts.com  
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  Auctions are being held for single units or multiple units of a given item.  We did not 
encounter any share auction, maybe because of the difficulty to implement such an auction 
through the internet.  In share auction the buyers are required to submit a schedule of quantities 
they are willing to buy at different price levels, the seller will determine the price that equates 
demand with supplies, and sells to each what he demanded (Wilson 1979).  Although the 
computation part can be, left to the website, there are still problems on how to submit the 
schedules and if the seller owns the website what prevents them from leaving an excess demand 
in order to charge a higher price per unit! 
  The type of items auctioned off lies between the polar cases of private value and the 
common value.  For private value items the bids are based only on the own valuation of the item, 
such items are usually bought for ones own use.  For items of common value, the bids are based 
on the bidder's own valuation and some information that the bidder can gather about the item as 
well, such items are usually meant for resale or for wealth extraction such as mineral rights.  In 
regard to internet auctions, the same classification still applies in the sense that most of C2C or 
B2C internet auctions are for items whose main reason of purchase is the end-use and all B2B 
auctions are for items to be resold or used by the purchasing business.  This excludes consumers 
selling items to businesses (unless it is some kind of skill) and consumers purchasing items with 
common value with the intent of resale, since it is cheaper to buy those items from stores or 
garage sales.  Usually consumers offer for sale items that do not fit their needs anymore, or new 
items that they cannot return to the seller. 
 
2.3. Internet Auction Rules 
Internet auctions introduced new rules and procedures for both buyers and sellers and they can 
be summarized in three points, registration allowing the use of the website by sellers and buyers,  
8




All auction website we visited require a registration for both the seller and the buyer, upon 
registration the user is given an ID and an access password, the information requested include an 
e-mail address home/business address, home/business phone number and fax.  Some websites 
such as eBay use the e-mail address to send a confirmation code to be used the first time users 
access the website.  Some other websites like TheSeriousCollector require valid credit card 
information in order to check the address and to make sure that the user reached the legal age.  
Some websites like Yahoo
18 do not make any checking, since upon registration the site provides 
any user with a free e-mail address.  However, Yahoo requires any seller to provide credit card 
information before listing any item. 
In order to preserve a safe environment web sites require credit card information.   
Auction sites such as Up4Sale
19, do not use credit card verification, but make random auditing 
for phone numbers to check the identity of the users.  Another way to secure transactions is the 
use of escrow services such as I-Escrow
20 who charges the buyer and/or the seller up to 6% of 
the transaction amount, or TradeSafe
21, who charges the buyer up to 5% of the purchase price 
and the shipping and handling cost.  Escrow services handle in a flawless way the transaction 
between the buyer and the seller. 
Other auction sites use a system of members rating service, where buyers and sellers post 
appreciations about each other reliability, this system is employed usually for C2C auctions or 
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19 http://www.up4sale.com 
20 http://www.iescrow.com  
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B2C auction, other sites like Auctions
22 offer the buyer a protection service in a program called 
Bid$afe.  Indeed security is a major factor among users a survey realized on October 1998
23 by 
The Graphics, Visualization & Usability (GVU) Center at Georgia Tech revealed that among the 
1,482 respondents, 44.4% consider security as a significant factor in online business, and 40.8% 
consider it as a deciding factor (figure 1).  Another concern among internet users seems to be 
about conducting international business online, the survey revealed that 67.1% are very 
concerned and 27% are somewhat concerned (figure 2), this can be justified by the high 
international shipping costs, custom taxes on imports, and difficulty to make claims in case of 
conflict between buyer and seller. 
 
Figure 1: Security a Factor in Online Business     Figure 2: Concern about International Business Online 
 
2.3.2. Costs of Website Use 
Given the number of auctions posted and the value of sales realized on internet auctions sites, 
one can predict that websites charging fees for the use of their auction service have a good 
source of revenue.  Generally, websites who are selling their own items do not charge any fee to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
21 http://www.tradesafe.com 
22 http://www.auctions.com 
23 http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/user_surveys/survey-1998-10/  
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bidders, websites who charge fees do that at different levels: registration, listing, feature 
category, feature showcase, and commission on the wining bid. 
  Registration fee: Some offline-auction houses charge an entry fee for bidders even if they 
do not submit any bid.  Although we did not encounter any website charging registration fees for 
internet auction, they might exist especially because of low bandwidth problem or if high 
affluence of members causes a network congestion or slow-down.  If popular, by charging a 
registration fee the website will keep only the active buyers or sellers and gives them a reason 
not to switch to another website once the fees are paid. 
  Listing fee: The Bargain Hut
24 and eBay, charge listing fees based of the reserve price or 
the starting bid, in some other website the listing fee is function of the memory size of the picture 
of the item if any, font style used in the heading of the item description and some other 
enhancements. 
  Feature category and showcase fee: Auctions.com for example charges fees for listing an 
item under different categories of products on the web site and charges another fee for listing the 
item in the showcase, which is a space that is shown every time a user is looking for items 
similar to the products in the showcase.  Items not registered in any category or any showcase are 
to be found by running a search which minimizes their chances for being seen by visitors and 
therefore sold. 
  Commission: Websites who host auctions usually charge a commission on the selling 
price of every successful auction
25, or if the item is not sold and a reserve price is specified the 
seller 'buys-it-back'
26 and he is charged a commission on the reserve price. Commissions are 
usually around 3% of the winning bid or the reserve price if the item is unsold.  The fees we 
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mentioned may all coexist in a single website, for instance Auctions and TheSeriousCollector, 
use the combination of many of those fees. 
 
2.3.3. Auction Institutions 
Auction Rules: With internet auctions, some auction methods are borrowed from off-line 
auctions, some are modified, and some others are new introductions.  In this subsection, we 
present the ones we encountered. 
English Auction:  "English Auctions are the most common type of auction probably 
because of its easy rules and its dynamism.  The English format can be used for an auction 
containing either a single item or multiple items.  In an English auction, the price is raised 
successively until the auction closes.  The high bidder(s) at that time are declared the winner(s) 
and each bidder is required to pay the seller the amount of their winning bid.  The bids are sorted 
in order of price, then time, and then quantity.  If bids are for the same price, the earlier bid wins.  
If bids are made for the same price at the same time, bids for larger quantities win.  The sort 
order only applies when there is a tie."
27  This auction is popular online and off-line because of 
its dynamism and the competition it creates among bidders. 
  Dutch Auction: In offline auctions this type of auctions is different from the one online. 
Offline, in the Dutch auction the seller starts by a price higher than all the bidders' willingness to 
pay for the object and keeps decreasing that price until one of the bidders accepts that price; this 
procedure is known also as mining.  This procedure is used for selling perishable goods such as 
tulips in Holland. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 http://www.acubid.com 
26 http://www.buffalobid.com 
27 http://auctions.excite.com  
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Over the internet, the Dutch auction is adequate for selling multiple identical items; the 
seller announces a starting bid and the number of items available.  Every bidder submits a bid, 
and a quantity, all winning bidders pay the same price, which is the lowest successful bid.  This 
might sound confusing; the example provided by eBay clarifies that: 
"A seller has 10 pens for auction at $1 each.  25 people bid $1 for one pen each.  In this 
case, only the earliest 10 bidders will win a pen since the bid amounts are the same and the 
earlier bids are accepted before the 15 later bids.  But, say one of those 25 bidders places a bid 
for higher than $1 - let's say, $2.  Since this person's bid is higher than all the others, she will be 
guaranteed a pen.  The earliest bidders who bid $1 will win the other nine pens.  The final price 
for each pen will be $1 (even though someone placed a high bid of $2) since all winning bidders 
pay the same price - which is the lowest successful bid". 
This suggests that if there are less than 10 bidders who know that they value the item 
more than the remaining bidders do; then they should bid their valuations in order to make sure 
that each of them gets a pen.  However, at the end they each pay the highest or the earliest bid of 
the remaining bidders, which is less than their valuations.  This gives to the auction a taste of 
Vickrey auction. 
Multiunit Auction: This is another method for multiple-item auctions and is used by 
DealDeal
28, in the auction the highest bid always wins and if there is a tie in the bids, the greater 
quantity wins over the lesser quantity.  If the price and the quantity are ties then the bidder who 
placed the highest number of bids in the current auction wins and if price, quantity, and number 
of bid attempts are equal then the buyer who placed the earliest successful bid at the highest 
                                                           
28 http://www.dealdeal.com  
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price level wins.  Using the described priority rule, a list of winners is posted on the website at 
the end of the auction and the seller will contact them. 
  Yankee Auction: OnSale uses this form of auction and it applies when one or more 
identical items are offered at the same time.  Bids are ranked by the highest price, then the 
highest quantity, and then the time; earlier bids wins over later bids.  A variation of the Yankee 
auction used by OnSale also is the Express Auction, which is the same as Yankee Auction, but 
lasts for only one hour or a day for some merchandise. 
  Reverse auction: Priceline
29 uses this method, the buyer is required to name a price for 
some item, that information is transmitted to a network of sellers who will try to match it.  Here 
the information asymmetry is reversed because the seller is a professional and has an 
informational advantage about the value of the item and in case the buyer overshoots his bid, the 
seller payoff can be very high.  The Economist of July 24
th, 1999 reported that the economist 
Paul Milgrom from Stanford University is "skeptical about its long term prospects", because the 
buyer ignores the number of the other buyers, has limited information about what is available 
and he names the price only once.  All those reasons make chances of getting a good deal slim. 
  Double Auction: Double auctions are auction where both parties make continuous offers 
this can be compared to a great extend to the stock market if the buyer and the seller are known 
FastParts uses a similar version but the identity of the seller and the buyers is not disclosed, it is 
called a private double auction. 
Length of the auction: Offline English auction and the Japanese auction usually last until all but 
one bidder opt out; a deadline is reached for the sealed bid auctions, or until one bidder shouts 
"mine" in the Dutch auction.  In general, auctions held at auction houses do not last very long; 
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sometimes it is just a matter of few minutes.  Internet auction length is variable and can last from 
few minutes (flash auction, used by FirstAuction
) to many days.  Same auction websites offer the 
seller the option to decide on the closing time even if there is still bidding activity.  Websites like 
OnSale or Rails-R-Us
30 make an extension over the preset time until no bidding is being 
submitted for respectively 5 minutes and 30 minutes, the time extension is called 'Going, Going, 
Gone' period.  The introduction of this feature prevents 'sniping'.  Rail-R-Us an online railroad 
and transportation items auction site defines 'sniping' as follows: "Sniping is the practice of 
withholding bidding, not starting bidding, or waiting until just before the close time of an auction 
to place a bid.  The idea is to not arouse interest in an item, then bid or outbid just before closing 
so other potential bidder do not have an opportunity to raise the price." 
Variations: Among the variations and the additions to the previous options that we encountered 
are the minimum bid increments, a starting bid, reserve price, the proxy bid, 'Take-It-Price' 
auction, and live auction. 
The minimum bid increments is set by the seller in some websites and is subject to 
change during the auction; the variation of the bid increment can accelerate or slow down the 
bidding.  The starting bid informs the buyers about the level from which the bidding should start, 
it is set beforehand, and made public; it serves to eliminate bidders with very low reservation 
value.  In some auctions the seller can set a reserve price below which the item will not be sold, 
the reserve price can be disclosed or undisclosed. 
When there is no reserve price, the successful bidder who bid above the starting bid wins 
the item and the seller is in the obligation to accept the bid.  However, when there is a 
reservation price the successful bid is accepted only if it is greater than the reserve price.   
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Disclosure of the reserve price is not advisable because bidders try to bid as close as possible to 
the reserve price while if the reserve price is not disclosed bidders are more aggressive in 
bidding, in internet auctions the website forces the seller to accept the successful bid greater than 
the reserve price, which eliminates cheating. 
The proxy bid known also as proxy robot or automatic bidding is used by many websites 
like Up4Sale, Haggle, and Yahoo.  Proxy bids appeared with the internet auctions and it is a 
system in which bids are placed on behalf of the bidder at the lowest increment each time the 
bidder is outbid, up to a certain level that is at or below the reservation value of the bidder.  
Proxy bidding allows bidders to stay active in an auction without necessarily monitoring its 
progress.  It is to note that proxy bidding is not efficient to use in internet Dutch auctions, 
because one can still win the item without having to outbid the other bidders. 
  The 'Take-it-Price' auction is used in conjunction with the single item English auction and 
is used by Amazon
31.  In the 'Take-it-Price' auction, a bidder can seize the item by being the first 
to offer the 'Take-it-Price' and eliminates the risk of being outbid (Budish and Takeyama 2001).  
BuffaloBid is using a form of auction called live auction, where "buyers participate in quasi 'real-
time' by entering an area much like a 'chat room' where items will be sold.  Using forms, buyers 
continue to place their bids until the auction closes and a winner is announced, or they drop out 
of the bidding.  Each "Live Auction" area will have an open and close time with a pre-
determined list of items for sale."
32  The table below without seeking completeness summarizes 
the main features of internet auction and gives example of websites. 
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Table 1: Internet Auctions Summary of Description 
Examples  Auction  Length Business  Model Fees  Other  Features
http://auctions.excite.com English        
http://www.acubid.com      Price commission   
http://www.amazon.com        Take-it-Price 
http://www.auctions.com      
Category 
& Showcase  Bid$afe 
http://www.b2b-auction.com     B2B     
http://www.buffalobid.com      Buy-it-Back   
http://www.dealdeal.com Multiunit        
http://www.ebay.com Dutch    
Listing (based on 
 reserve price)   
http://www.fastpatrs.com Double    B2B     
http://www.firstauction.com   Flash B2C  None   
http://www.onsale.com Yankee Express       
http://www.priceline.com Reverse        
http://www.railsrus.com   Going, going, gone      
http://www.yahoo.com     C2C    Proxy Bid 
 
3. BIDDERS' PROFILE 
In this section, we describe internet users that are likely to participate in an internet auction, it is 
important to know who is placing bids over the internet for both individual sellers and businesses 
starting their online auction, that way they know what kind of products to offer.  In what follows, 
we present a description of the dataset and the dual-scaling technique, and then the results. 
 
3.1. Contingency Tables and Dual Scaling 
From the GVU WWW 10
th survey (October 1998), we retained the answers of 1,482 respondents 
to the following question: How likely are you to participate in an "online auction" for something 
you were interested in purchasing? 
Their answers are summarized in figure 3 and table 3 (in appendix 1):  
17
 
Figure 3: How likely are you to participate in an "online auction"? 
 
Along with the summary data, in appendix 1 we include contingency tables (tables 4, 5, 
and 6).  The contingency tables are for Sex, Online Experience, Skill Level
33, Location, and Age 
Group.  First, we test the association between the likelihood of participating in an online auction 
and each of these characteristics.  Where there is significant association, we use dual scaling to 
get more information about the association.  The test procedure is presented hereafter. 
Let  ij f  be the observed number of people who answered i  to the "online auction" 
participation question and whose other characteristic (sex, experience, skill level, location, or age 
group) is j.  Let  ∑ = •
j
ij i f T ,  ∑ = •
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• • =  be the expected number of people who answered i while their 
characteristic is j.  This provides us with a table of expected values and naturally we should have 
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Now we have all the information to test the following Null hypotheses: 
H0: No association between rows and columns of the contingency table. 
We reject H0 if  ()











α χ , where α ,  r,  c are respectively the 
significance level, the number of rows and columns and  ( ) ) 1 )( 1 (
2 − − c r α χ  is the chi-square 
tabulated value at level α  and () ) 1 )( 1 ( − − c r  degrees of freedom. 
  The result of the test shows that there is association between the likelihood of 
participating in online auction and each of Online Experience, Skill Level, Location, and Age 
Group, for Sex the test is not significant a 5%. 
Table 2: Association Test 
 Pearson  Chi-Square 
Characteristic Value DF Prob. 
Sex  10.835 5  5.474% 
Experience  41.973 10 0.000% 
Skill Level  139.146 15 0.000% 
Location  32.817 10 0.029% 
Age Group  34.020 15 0.338% 
 
  The existence of association between the likelihood of participating in an internet auction 
from one hand and Experience, Skill Level, Location, and Age Group from the other hand, 
allows for a further study of the relationship described above.  The study of the relationship is 
performed using a data analysis technique called dual scaling, which applies to cases where all 
the available data is summarized in the form of a contingency table.  
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  The approach of dual-scaling that we look into is called the analysis of variance, which if 
we adopt the following notations (Nishisato 1994), consists in determining columns weight x 
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  c r ij f × = ] [ F   ; the contingency table or data matrix. 
  r f     ; the vector of row totals of F. 
  c f   ;   the vector of columns of F. 
  r D     ; the diagonal matrix with row totals in the main diagonal. 
  c D     ; the diagonal matrix with column totals in the main diagonal 
  y    ; a vector of weights for the rows of F. 
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Lagrangian function of the problem we have: 
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  The first-order conditions of the problem are: 
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Fx D F x
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r           ( 4 )  
  The Lagrangian multiplier is no other than the squared correlation ration, 
2 η .  Equation 
(2) can be rewritten into: 
( ) 0 '
1 = −
− x D F D F
2
c r η         ( 5 )  
  which if pre-multiplied by 
1 −
c D  yields the eigenequation: 
( ) 0 '
1 1 = −
− − x I F D F D
2 η r c          ( 6 )  
  The problem now is to find the eigenvalues and the eigenvectors of  F D F D S
1 1 '
− − = r c .  It is 
to note that in order to avoid the asymmetry of S, Nishisato (1994) presented an iterative method 
to find 
2 η ,  x, and y, but the use of any software that handles matrices operation will easily 
provide all the eigenvalues and the associated eigenvectors of S. 
  Once the trivial solution of  1
2 = η  is excluded; the eigenvector x, associated with the 
highest value of 










         ( 7 )  
  At this level, we obtained what is called the first solution with a percentage of total 











.  Nishisato (1994) offers a different formulation for  1 δ , 
but it gives the same result since every eigenvalue explains part of the association and the sum of 
the non-trivial eigenvalues explains all the association.  If the first solution is judged insufficient  
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to explain the correlation between rows and columns then a second or more solutions can be 
found by calculating the associated eigenvector x, and hence the vector y, by taking lower 
eigenvalues.  The number of possible non-trivial solutions is equal to  ) 1 , 1 min( − − c r . 
  Nishisato (1994) used an iterative method to find the weights x and y, by taking an 
arbitrary vector to start the iterative process and when the result converges the process is 
stopped.  However, the use of a non-iterative method but consistent with the theory provides a 
different result.  The differences in results should not matter because the ultimate objective of 
dual-scaling is to find rows' weights and columns' weights from which an association can be 
inferred, and that objective is reached using either method since they both provide the same 
conclusions and captures the same level of information. 
 
3.2. Results and Discussion  
The results of the dual scaling can be found in appendix 3 (tables 7, 8, 9, and 10).  The purpose 
of dual scaling is to, as mentioned earlier, infer associations between the likelihood of 
participating in an internet auction and some other characteristics.  Once the weights for the first 
solution are computed they can be plotted as in figure 4.  If we consider internet experience, we 
can see that the first solution explains over 91% of the association between the likelihood to 
participate in an online auction and the internet experience.  What we need to look for are 
clusters formed by individuals who answered 'Very Likely' and 'Somewhat Likely' to the survey 
question.  We do not need to look for any clusters around the rest of the answers to the survey 
question because in this section, the question we are trying to answer is what is the profile of an 
internet user who is likely to participate in an internet auction?  If we use the first solution only 
(figure 4), one can see that individuals having over 4 years of internet experience are the ones 
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Figure 4: 1
st Solution of Auction vs. Experience 
 
In case, the first solution is not enough to explain the association (low 
2 η ) or for a better 
appraisal of the associations, recourse to a second solution is necessary.  We wrote a computer 
program to find all the solutions (appendix 2).  In our case, we limit ourselves to interpret the 
first and the second solutions as they largely explain the existing associations between the 
likelihood to participate in an online auction and the other characteristics.  The first and the 
second solution explain 100% of the association between the likelihood to participate in an 
internet auction and the internet experience of the respondent from one hand and his location 
from the other hand.  The two first solutions explain 97.5% of the association with respect to 
internet skills and 95% with respect to the age. 
If we want to consider both the first and the second solution we need to account for the 
importance of each solution, which is judged by the magnitude of 
2 η , hence the introduction of 
adjusted weights ( ) () k k k k k k y x y x η η , , =
∗ ∗  for every solution k.  Then we can plot 
∗
2 x  against 
∗
1 x  for  
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the columns (experience, skill, location, or age) and on the same graph plot 
∗
2 y  against 
∗
1 y  for the 
rows (the survey question).  The graphs for the different characteristics are available in appendix 
3 (figures 5, 6, 7, and 8).  It is important to keep in mind that the use of a second solution may 
not bring any additional information to the association, but for the sake of completeness, we 
opted to present it as part of the technique expose. 
A closer look at figure 5 shows that the answers 'Very Likely' and 'Somewhat Likely' to 
the survey question are closer to 'over 4 years' of experience than to any other choice, that is the 
kind of associations we are looking for.  However, this does not exclude people who have 'over 4 
years' of internet experience from not participating in an internet auction.  The association we 
found might be explained by the necessity to spend time to understand and to know how to look 
for information over the internet and then to start relying on the internet for shopping.  The fact 
that the first solution explained 91.16% of the association did not leave room for the second 
solution to bring any additional information. 
Regarding the association between the answer to the survey question and internet skills 
(figure 6), we could spot out two associations.  The first association is between 'Expert' and 'Very 
Likely' and the second is between 'Experienced' and 'Somewhat Likely'. This might indicate that 
in order for an internet user to start considering participating in an internet auction, he/she must 
have already performed certain tasks over the internet, such as registering in some web based 
services, ordering online, sending e-mail, etc… 
Internet users who are most likely to participate in an online auction are located in the 
United States (figure 7), and that can be attributed to different factors.  The vast majorities of 
internet web sites are located in the US and operate in English.  The early development of the 
internet in the U.S. in comparison with the rest of the world and the ease of access to computers  
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in general and to the internet in particular made internet users located in the U.S. more familiar 
and keen on exploring new ways of conducting business.  However, that is likely to change in 
the future as internet use increases in other parts of the world. 
Concerning age, the groups of people who are most likely to participate in an online 
auction belong to the 26-50 age group (figure 8).  This is probably because people in that age 
group have the necessary financial and time resources and may be because they spend more time 
in front of their computers than other age groups do. 
To summarize, the profile of people who are most likely to take part in an online auction 
is as follows: they are rather familiar with the internet and have some skills using it, are located 
in the U.S. and are from the age group 26-50.  Of course, the results are subject to discussion 
because of the way the data was collected and because of the fast development and popularity of 
the internet, if we had a similar data set collected a year later it would have probably gave 
different patterns of association.  The data collection is subject to criticism because it is based on 
a sample of internet users that is not necessarily representative and who happens to visit certain 
popular web sites and who have the time and the motivation to fill in correctly the survey form, 
there is self-selection bias.  Although the association patterns we obtained may not be complete, 
for instance because of the absence of association for age group 21-25 year old, but they 
certainly do not represent any contradictions with the expectations and the intuition. 
 
4. IMPLICATIONS OF INTERNET AUCTIONS 
Internet auctions implication are at more than one level, here we are concerned with the 
implications regarding economic insights for economists and the changes in economic activities.  
Regarding the concerns that some economists might have we would like to point out that the 
investigation of new strategic equivalences between auction institutions or checking the  
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empirical validity of the ones that already exist within the corpus of auction theory, is just the 
apparent tip of the iceberg.  At the theoretical level, what economists should be concerned with 
are the bidding strategies.  Internet auctions introduced new rules and choices; naturally, one 
should expect a change in the bidding strategies of buyers in general and a change in sellers' 
choices regarding the auction method and other variation that can be used with it.  It is known 
that in auctions the informational asymmetry is to the advantage of the buyer and that in a car 
purchase transaction for example the informational asymmetry is to the advantage of the seller.  
What happens if a car is being auctioned off over the internet?  There are two different types of 
adverse selection one to the advantage of the seller and the other to the advantage of the buyer.  
How that will affect the bidder's behavior?  Which of those asymmetries will affect most the 
wining bid? 
In internet auctions, even if a seller provides a full description of an item, there is nothing 
in it that says why the item is being sold.  It could be a camera that is sold because it has an 
abnormal consumption of batteries, or because the seller found somewhere else a better camera 
within the same range of price, or may be because the camera has been over used in a short 
period and the way it looks does not indicate anything about that. 
Another theoretical point worth investigating is the optimal fee structure that auction web 
sites charge to the sellers and buyers and whether the existing fee structures induce inefficiencies 
or counter incentives to bidders, and if sellers have incentive to post for auction items that have 
chances to be sold or not.  If the actual fee and commission structure allow sellers to post items 
with low probability of being sold then those fees and commissions should be revised because it 
is more beneficial for an auction site to have a page full of successful items than with 
unsuccessful ones.  The lack of sales will affect the quality and the number of visitors of the site  
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and hence its revenues in general (fees and advertisements).  Indeed, "This difference in fees has 
an important effect on sellers’ incentives and behavior.  Because Yahoo! does not charge fees for 
auction listings, a seller has less incentive to make sure that her auction results in an actual 
transaction.  Indeed, a quick check reveals that most Yahoo! auctions have very high reserve 
prices, with the sellers apparently hoping for a 'sucker' to come along and be willing to pay their 
high price.  By contrast, at eBay and Amazon, sellers know that they will incur a listing fee 
whether the item sells or not, so they have an incentive to set reasonably low reserve prices to 
create a higher probability of resulting in a transaction" (Lucking-Reiley 2000). 
At the empirical level economists should look into the allocative efficiency of internet 
auctions, in the past when households had items that they do not need anymore they either sell 
them in a garage sale, donate them, or they end-up in the dumpster.  It was not possible to 
organize auctions for many items because of the high cost of organizing such an auction 
compared to the expected earnings; the earnings can be low because of the intrinsic value of the 
item and because of the lack of bidders at the local level.  It will be interesting to evaluate the 
amount of wealth generated from items that had no resale value before the internet auction and 
that are now being exchanged through C2C auctions. 
  At a more practical level internet, auctions can be more efficient and collusion proof than 
offline auction.  In the case of B2B auction, the use of the internet can reduce the collusion 
among bidders and increase their participation in number.  With offline auctions, it happens that 
businesses collude and use side payments inside and outside the company in order to win an item 
or a contract.  If the auction is not largely diffused, few bidders will submit bids and some 
bidders might win because of the lack of bidders or existing bidders will collude in order to keep 
the winning bid low.  With the use of the internet, it is easy and almost costless to make the  
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auction public either through its publication on a web page or through mass e-mail distribution 
with undisclosed list of recipients.  The fact that there is larger number of bidders whose identity 
is undisclosed makes it less likely for collusions to form and makes bidding more aggressive. 
  Internet auctions invaded grounds that used to belong to auction houses, the fact that 
bidders do not have to be physically present during the auction increased the number of bidders 
in many auctions, which made sellers more keen to list their items on the internet rather than 
using the auction house services.  Since, thousand or rather millions of items are being listed, the 
websites were able to lower their fees and commissions compared to what auction houses charge 
and still attract many sellers and buyers to their auctions.  Although, popular internet auctions do 
not have the required expertise and staff to authenticate valuable items such as paintings and 
diamonds, in order to enhance their respective efficiencies and earnings, some internet websites 
and auction houses joined forces.  Amazon and Sotheby's Holdings, Inc. announced a venture of 
$45 million to create a joint auction website (Ginty, 1999b).  This venture will allow art and 
antique dealers to market their goods to Amazon's customers.  Another operation of large scale is 
the acquisition of the auction house Butterfield & Butterfield by eBay for about $260 million; the 
acquisition will allow eBay to enter the European and the Asian markets trough the auction 
house rich network (Ginty 1999a; Masterson 1999).  The question is to what extent auction 
houses and auction websites will merge, are we going to witness the disappearance of centuries 
old auction houses behind the success of internet websites and will that ultimately trigger a 
merger among popular auction websites?  What are the gains or losses to the buyers and sellers? 
One last point that needs investigation is the following; internet auction offer the facility 
to be always an active bidder using proxy bids.  But, if the auction website owns the items being 
auctioned what prevents the seller from introducing a fictitious bidder with a bid just a little less  
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that the highest proxy bid limit and then outbid the fictitious bidder by the bidder with the 
highest proxy bid limit and making him pay the highest he is willing to bid.  For example: let A 
and B be two bidders using proxy bids with limits of $100 and $75 respectively, if the minimum 
bid increment is $5, what prevents the website from introducing a fictitious bidder C with a bid 
of $95 and than outbid it with a $100 bid from A?  This last point suggests the study of 
compatibility among internet auction methods and other feature from the seller and the buyer 
point of view. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The recent development of the internet and its popularity among users made the growth of e-
commerce businesses and online auction websites relatively easy considering that five years ago 
many of them where nonexistent.  E-commerce and online auctions seem to be competing for the 
same group of consumers and many identical items seem to be available in both of them.  In this 
paper, we present a description of the principal features of internet auctions, then we set up a 
profile for an online auction bidder, and we found that bidders are most likely located in the 
U.S., have some internet experience and skills and that they belong to the 26-50 age group.  We 
also look into the implications of the development of online auction, those implication touch 
both research in economic theory and economic activity.  The new environment introduced by 
online auctions requires investigation at the consumer behavior level and the firm level, 
especially if we consider the mergers that are happening now and the multitude of auction 
methods and techniques that risk blurring buyers understanding of the rules of each method.  At 
the informational level, it looks that the buyer is more worried than the seller about adverse 
selection issues.  The buyer is more concerned about quality issues that the seller is concerned 
about extracting the highest price for the item.  We feel it should not be the case because buyers'  
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valuation should take into account the information withheld by the seller, the valuation in turn 
affects the bidding behavior, which will affect the seller's payoff.  Of course, this is pure 
speculation that needs to be looked into in more details. 
The use of internet auctions will certainly affect the efficiency of the price system as a 
whole, but might also create inefficient behavior if bidders do not devote enough time to collect 
information about the item being auctioned and the listed price for it.  It is common to find bids 
above the store price of an item, or bidding a little less than the store price for a second hand 
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APPENDIX 1: Data Description 
 
Table 3: How likely are you to participate in an "online auction"? 
  Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Not familiar  48 3.2  3.2 
Very likely  198 13.4  16.6 
Somewhat likely  358 24.2  40.8 
Neither likely nor unlikely  215 14.5  55.3 
Somewhat unlikely  270 18.2  73.5 
Very unlikely  393 26.5  100 
Total  1482 100  - 
 
 
Table 4: Contingency tables for Experience and Skill Level 
Experience Skill  Level 
  <1 Yr. 1-3 Yrs >4 YrsTotal Novice Intermediate Experienced Expert Total
Not familiar  11 16 19  46  20 13  9  4  46 
Very likely  15 47 133  195 9 38  76  72  195
Somewhat likely  31 99 219  349 28 88  148  85  349
Neither likely nor unlikely  36 67 112  215 30 57  89 39  215
Somewhat unlikely  40 75 151  266 34 76  109  47  266
Very unlikely  61 142 184  387 79 140  125 43  387
Total 194  446  818  1458 200  412  556  290  1458
 
 
Table 5: Contingency tables for Location and Age Group 
Location Age  Group 
  USA Europe Other  Total  11-20 21-25  26-50  50+  Total 
Not familiar  30 9  7  46  4 5 31 6 46 
Very likely  184 7  4  195  6 26 123 38  193 
Somewhat likely  294 29  26  349  24 51 213 53 341 
Neither likely nor unlikely  177 23  15  215  10 27 140 31 208 
Somewhat unlikely  218 29  19  266  15 40 166 41 262 
Very unlikely  320 31  36  387  20 34 222 104  380 
Total 1223  128  107  1458  79  183  895  273  1430 
 
 
Table 6: Contingency table for Sex 
Sex 
   Female Male  Total 
Not familiar  20 26  46 
Very likely  55 140  195 
Somewhat likely  101 248  349 
Neither likely nor unlikely  64 151  215 
Somewhat unlikely  76 190  266 
Very unlikely  141 246  387 
Total 457  1001  1458  
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APPENDIX 2: Computer Program 
 




%University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA. 
% 
%This program determines the row and columns weights of a contingency table  
%and provides all the solutions. (the number of solutions that fully explain  
%the data is min(#rows-1,#columns-1) 
% 
%Based on: 
%Shizuhiko Nishisato (1994): 
%"Elements of Dual Scaling: An Introduction to Practical Data Analysis" 
%Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, New Jersey. 
% 
%This program is written for MATLAB 5 by Chokri Dridi, Spring 2000. 






%The data matrix is an ASCII space separated file. 
load c:\windows\desktop\age.txt -ascii 
 










%The eigenvalues are obtained from (S-lambda*I)x=0 
S=inv(Dc)*F'*inv(Dr)*F; 
 
%Stores the eigen values in a vector lambda, the first value is a trivial  
%solution it is 1 (highest value) 
lambda=eig(S); 
 
%Gets the eigen vector (V) and the eigen values 
[V,tmp]=eig(S,'nobalance'); 
 









%Gets the position of the highest eigen value and its position in lambda  




    
   disp('Solution #') 
   disp(i) 
    
   disp('The squared correlation ratio (eigen value) is:') 
   disp(lambda(p(id-(i-1)))); 
    
    
   disp('The Columns Weights are:') 
   x=V(:,p(id-(i-1))); 
   disp(x) 
    
   disp('The Adjusted Columns Weights are:') 
   disp(sqrt(lambda(p(id-(i-1))))*x) 
    
   disp('The Rows Weights are:'); 
   y=inv(Dr)*F*x/sqrt(lambda(p(id-(i-1)))); 
   disp(y); 
    
   disp('The Adjusted Rows Weights are:') 
   disp(sqrt(lambda(p(id-(i-1))))*y) 
    
   %Percentage of total information explained 
   sigma=100*lambda(p(id-(i-1)))/sum(lambda); 
   disp('sigma ='); 
   disp(sigma); 
   
end  
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st Solution vs. 2





nd Solutions of the Association between Online Auction and Online Experience 
1st Solution  Weight  Adj. Weight  2nd Solution  Weight  Adj. Weight 
Not familiar  -0.2685 -0.0435  Not familiar  -3.2404 -0.1620 
Very likely  -0.0418 -0.0068  Very likely  2.3562 0.1178 
Somewhat likely  0.0915 0.0148  Somewhat likely  1.4226 0.0711 
Neither likely nor unlikely  -0.1209 -0.0196  Neither likely nor unlikely  -0.9322 -0.0466 
Somewhat unlikely  -0.1765 -0.0286  Somewhat unlikely  -0.0664 -0.0033 
Very unlikely  0.1590 0.0257  Very unlikely  -1.5215 -0.0761 
         
<1 Year  -0.8083 -0.1308  <1 Year  -0.844 -0.0422 
1-3 Years  0.5759 0.0932  1-3 Years  -0.3608 -0.0180 
>4 Years  -0.1223 -0.0198  >4 Years  0.3969 0.0198 
         
Nu-2  0.0262   Nu-2  0.0025  
Sigma  91.1683   Sigma  8.8317  
          

































st Solution vs. 2





nd Solutions of the Association between Online Auction and Online Skills 
1st Solution  Weight  Adj. Weight  2nd Solution  Weight  Adj. Weight 
Not familiar  1.1205 0.3224  Not familiar  1.8802 0.1899 
Very likely  -0.6577 -0.1893  Very likely  0.6493 0.0656 
Somewhat likely  -0.2893 -0.0832  Somewhat likely  -0.1438 -0.0145 
Neither likely nor unlikely  0.0089 0.0026  Neither likely nor unlikely  -0.1219 -0.0123 
Somewhat unlikely  0.0060 0.0017  Somewhat unlikely  -0.2845 -0.0287 
Very unlikely  0.4501 0.1295  Very unlikely  -0.1577 -0.0159 
         
Novice  0.7718 0.2221  Novice  0.6744 0.0681 
Intermediate  0.2369 0.0682  Intermediate  -0.3407 -0.0344 
Experienced  -0.1564 -0.0450  Experienced  -0.2952 -0.0298 
Expert  -0.5690 -0.1637  Expert  0.5848 0.0591 
         
Nu-2  0.0828   Nu-2  0.0102  
Sigma  86.7616   Sigma  10.7041  
         






































st Solution vs. 2





nd Solutions of the Association between Online Auction and Location 
1st Solution  Weight  Adj. Weight  2nd Solution  Weight  Adj. Weight 
Not familiar  1.0985 0.1557  Not familiar  -0.2130 -0.0104 
Very likely  -0.6178 -0.0876  Very likely  -0.1269 -0.0062 
Somewhat likely  -0.0208 -0.0029  Somewhat likely  0.0789 0.0039 
Neither likely nor unlikely  0.0902 0.0128  Neither likely nor unlikely  -0.3081 -0.0151 
Somewhat unlikely  0.1120 0.0159  Somewhat unlikely  -0.3096 -0.0152 
Very unlikely  0.0723 0.0103  Very unlikely  0.4021 0.0197 
         
USA  -0.1345 -0.0191  USA  0.0016 0.0001 
Europe  0.6910 0.0980  Europe  -0.6501 -0.0318 
Other  0.7103 0.1007  Other  0.7599 0.0372 
         
Nu-2  0.0201   Nu-2  0.0024  
Sigma  89.1194   Sigma  10.8806  
         



































st Solution vs. 2





nd Solutions of the Association between Online Auction and Age Group 
1st Solution  Weight  Adj. Weight  2nd Solution  Weight  Adj. Weight 
Not familiar  -0.3689 -0.0516  Not familiar  0.5346 0.0293 
Very likely  0.0422 0.0059  Very likely  -0.4623 -0.0253 
Somewhat likely  -0.3111 -0.0436  Somewhat likely  0.2280 0.0125 
Neither likely nor unlikely  -0.2727 -0.0382  Neither likely nor unlikely  -0.2018 -0.0111 
Somewhat unlikely  -0.3008 -0.0421  Somewhat unlikely  -0.0261 -0.0014 
Very unlikely  0.6590 0.0923  Very unlikely  0.0939 0.0051 
         
11-20  -0.2484 -0.0348  11-20  0.9923 0.0544 
21-25  -0.5309 -0.0743  21-25  -0.1012 -0.0055 
26-50  -0.1142 -0.0160  26-50  -0.0703 -0.0039 
50+  0.8022 0.1123  50+  0.0112 0.0006 
         
Nu-2  0.0196   Nu-2  0.0030  
Sigma  82.3633   Sigma  12.6817  
         
Sigma Total  95.0450        
 